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Abstract 
 
This paper studies teacher mobility using matched employee-employer panel data from 
Norwegian primary and lower secondary schools. The Norwegian institutional set-up with 
completely centralized wage setting for teachers is ideal to analyze the effect of non-pecuniary 
job attributes on quit decisions. We find that teachers tend to leave schools with high share of 
minority students and high share of students with special needs. In addition, the composition of 
teachers and the school size affect the propensity to quit. These results are robust across different 
econometric specifications and sub-samples. 
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1. Introduction. 
This paper studies the effect of non-pecuniary job attributes on individual teacher quit behavior. 
While sociologists, psychologists and industrial researchers all stress the importance of non-
pecuniary job characteristics for worker turnover, economists have paid more attention to pay as 
the main motivation for worker quit decisions.1 According to search models, workers quit a job 
when the discounted utility stream in the current job falls short of the discounted utility stream 
associated with alternative job offers (Burdett, 1978). Empirical models analyzing individual quit 
behavior in this tradition typically assume that the wage is the key variable describing utility 
levels in different jobs. However, in several countries with centralized pay bargaining, important 
segments of the labor market exhibit little or no variation at all in wages across jobs. In such 
environments, only a limited part of worker job to job mobility would be motivated by wage 
differences, while non-wage job attributes should be important determinants of individual 
turnover.  
  
The labor market for teachers in most European countries is a prominent example of such an 
environment, with teacher pay almost exclusively determined by the amount of formal education 
and teaching experience. While wage differences between teaching and non-teaching is clearly 
relevant to understand why teachers move from teaching to non-teaching jobs, the national 
teacher wage system suggests that teachers also search across schools in order to find a match 
which satisfies their preferences with regard to non-wage job characteristics. Within such a 
setting it is important to identify what type of schools teachers like and dislike. If non-pecuniary 
attributes differ between schools, it is likely that teacher quality can differ substantially between 
schools even within areas with similar costs of living. For example, if teachers tend to leave 
schools with many minority students, serious problems with low teacher quality may arise in 
these schools. Further, cost of living varies across geographical areas. Hence, equal teacher 
nominal pay across areas suggests that teacher quality may suffer in areas where living costs are 
high and thereby the real teacher wage is low. 
 
The extreme wage rigidity described above has been one of the cornerstones in teacher union 
wage policy in many European countries and the unions have claimed that teacher pay equality 
prevent large regional differences in teacher quality. However, the arguments presented above 
                                                 
1 Clark (2001) provides a short overview of the literature on job quits and job satisfaction in psychology, sociology 
and management and presents evidence showing that job satisfaction measures are important predictors of worker 
quits even after controlling for wages. 
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suggest that equality in teacher quality across schools is implausible in a rigid teacher wage 
system. As schools are prevented from using wage policy to retain and attract teachers, while 
teachers sort themselves between school according to preferences for non-wage school 
characteristics, non-attractive schools from the teachers point of view are likely to be left with 
lower quality teachers.  Taken together with the strong evidence for teacher quality as the most 
important factor in education production (Rivkin, Hanushek & Kain, 2001), this suggests that 
teacher mobility is an important research issue. As a first step towards an assessment of the costs 
of a rigid pay system, the purpose of this paper is to quantify empirically the effect of non-
pecuniary school and district variables on teacher exit decisions. To our knowledge, the present 
paper appears to be the first study of this kind in Europe.2 
 
Most existing evidence on teacher moves across schools and school districts is based on US data. 
However, the US system with wage setting at the school district level makes studies of the 
relationship between teacher quit behavior and non-pecuniary school attributes complicated by 
the fact that school district wages themselves can easily respond to such factors. Thus, 
identification of the causal effect of non-pecuniary factors on teacher moves requires additional 
assumptions compared to the European institutional setting. Nevertheless, non-pecuniary factors 
and opportunity costs have been found to be important determinants of teacher sorting and hence 
the quality of teachers in recent studies by Loeb & Page (2000), Hanushek, Kain & Rivkin 
(2001), Lankford, Loeb & Wyckoff (2002) and Boyd, Lankford, Loeb & Wyckoff (2003). 
 
A further limitation with the US research on teacher mobility is that most studies have used data 
for specific states. This implies that teachers moving to schools in other states are implicitly 
treated equal to teachers leaving the education sector completely, which may be a too restrictive 
assumption. Further, recent US evidence suggests that a large share of teacher sorting and 
teacher moves takes place within school districts, which may imply that studies focusing on 
inter-district teacher moves may only reveal a quite limited part of actual teacher mobility (Betts, 
Reuben & Danenberg. (2001) and Lankford et al. (2002).3  
 
                                                 
2 UK teachers’ decision to quit teaching has been studied by Dolton & Mavromaras (1990) and Dolton & van der 
Klaauw (1995), but these studies do not consider the effect of school specific factors such as student composition 
and school size on the decision to quit. 
3 An exception on inter-district-mobility is the study by Greenberg & McCall (1974). 
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The present study contributes to the research on teacher sorting by analyzing teacher transitions 
between schools and out of the school system using a complete matched individual teacher-
school data set for all Norwegian primary and lower secondary public school teachers combined 
with detailed information of the schools during the period covering the school years 1992/93 to 
1999/2000. Ironically, the completely centralized teacher wage setting system may be ideal for 
studies of non-wage determinants of mobility since identification problems due to compensating 
wage differentials do not arise. A possible objection to this argument is that non-pecuniary 
attributes of teacher positions are not fixed, but adjust endogenously in the absence of wage 
flexibility. As an example, schools may have incentives to decrease teacher workloads in areas 
with teacher shortages to compensate for the inflexibility of wages. However, such behavior is 
severely restricted in Norway by national regulations. The teacher workload, for instance, is 
completely determined in collective bargaining between the teacher union and the central 
government. In addition, the data enable us to distinguish completely between teachers leaving 
the education sector and teachers moving between schools within and between school districts. 
Bonesrønning, Falch & Strøm (2003) show that the supply of certified teachers varies a lot 
between Norwegian schools even within school districts, and that certified teachers seem to 
prefer large schools with few minority students.4  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the association 
between teacher turnover and non-pecuniary school factors. In section 3 we present the 
theoretical and institutional background of the empirical analysis, section 4 contains a 
description of the data, while section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Previous studies on teacher turnover 
A number of studies suggests that higher wages reduce teacher quit propensity, for example 
Baugh & Stone (1982), Murnane & Olsen (1989), Theobald (1990), Gritz & Theobald (1996), 
Dolton & van der Klaauw (1995, 1999), Brewer (1996), Mont & Reese (1996), and 
Stinebrickner (1998, 2001). However, only a few studies provide systematic evidence on the role 
of non-pecuniary factors in teacher quit decisions. The investigations on this issue have used two 
types of data: Administrative data on teachers from certain US states or school districts, and 
national US survey data. The main advantages of studies using administrative data is large 
                                                 
4 While the effective supply of certified teachers to a school analyzed by Bonesrønning et al. (2003) is determined 
by both the entry and exit decisions of teachers, the present study focuses solely on the exit decision. 
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sample sizes and detailed information on school and student body characteristics. Their main 
weakness is that they rely on data from specific US states, which implies that teachers moving 
between states while continuing teaching is treated equal to those exiting the teaching profession. 
Studies using national surveys on US teachers are obviously more suited to give a complete 
picture of teacher mobility since they can make a distinction between those exiting the teaching 
profession and those migrating between states while continuing teaching.  On the other hand, 
these studies use small samples of teachers and have to rely on rather crude self-reported 
information on school characteristics. 
 
An early study by Greenberg & McCall (1974) on the mobility of teachers in the San Diego 
school district shows that experienced teachers tend to move from schools with high share of 
minority students and low average achievement. Hanushek et al. (2002), using a large 
administrative Texas data base, corroborate this finding by demonstrating that teachers currently 
working in schools with high minority share and low achievement students have a higher 
propensity to move from a school district. Their results also imply that non-pecuniary differences 
between schools related to student composition and quality is more important than wage 
differences for quit decisions. Lankford et al. (2002) use administrative data from New York 
State and shows that teacher quality differs systematically between schools both within and 
between school districts. Boyd et al. (2003) analyze the determinants of teacher choices and 
schools hiring decisions based on a two-sided matching model. Their results show that minority 
students have a negative effect on the utility of new teachers. 
 
Authors studying the effect of working conditions on teacher wages and teacher turnover have 
included measures of class size or resource use per student as explanatory variables. The 
underlying argument is that required teacher effort per teaching hour is higher in large than in 
small classes, and hence teachers favor schools with small classes and large resource use per 
student, usually approximated by the student-teacher ratio measured at the school level or district 
level. If wage flexibility is limited, schools may reduce class size in an attempt to improve 
working conditions and hence reduce teacher turnover.5 A detailed investigation of this issue can 
be found in Mont and Rees (1996). Using administrative data from New York State, they find 
that lower class size has a significant positive, but numerically small effect on length of stay in 
                                                 
5 With flexible wages, teachers at schools with low resource use are expected to be compensated with higher wages. 
Analyses of the relationship between the teacher wage level and school resource use include Kenny & Denslow 
(1980), Eberts & Stone (1985) and Levinson (1988). 
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teaching. Recent studies by Stinebrickner (1998, 1999) using national US survey data find no 
statistically significant association between class size and duration of teaching jobs.6 
 
  
3. Institutional and theoretical considerations 
 
3.1. Institutions 
Public primary and lower secondary education in Norway (first through tenth grade), free of user 
charges, is the responsibility of local governments. In contrast to school districts in the US, these 
local governments are multipurpose institutions that provide a large set of services in addition to 
education.7 Usually, there exists several public schools within each local government, and 
private schools are quite rare and do not provide a realistic alternative to public schools. Parental 
school choice between public schools for given residence is not allowed.  
 
Two institutional features are important in the understanding of teacher quality and teacher 
sorting in this particular market. First, in the period covered in this paper, teacher wages and 
workload were completely determined in national bargains between the teacher union and the 
central government. This national contract effectively prevented schools and districts from using 
wage policy to attract and retain teachers as the teacher wage was solely determined by the 
amount of formal education and teaching experience.8 Secondly, although the local government 
is the formal employer of teachers, hiring decisions are made by the school principal at each 
school and the teachers apply for jobs at the separate schools. There are no formal rules on the 
principal’s ranking of applicants except that non-certified teachers cannot be appointed if it is 
possible to appoint a certified teacher. In this respect, the system differs from that in the US, 
where school district authorities are directly involved in the allocation of teachers between 
schools within school districts. In the Norwegian setting, separations of teachers with permanent 
appointment are due to either voluntary quits or significantly reductions in the number of 
                                                 
6 Gritz & Theobald (1996) investigate the relationship between teacher turnover and spending on non-teacher items 
by the schools using administrative data from the state of Washington. The evidence suggests that higher school 
spending on central administration and instructional assistants decrease length of stay in teaching. Thus, their 
findings indicate that moving resources away from teachers to other school personnel increases teacher turnover. 
7 Spending on primary and lower secondary education accounts for about 30% of total local government spending.  
Other important services are care for the elderly, preschool education, and infrastructure. 
8 The wage received is independent of where the teaching experience is obtained. 
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students at the schools (including closing of schools). In the empirical period covered by this 
paper, the latter reason is of little relevance because the cohort sizes increased.  
 
3.2. Teacher quality and teacher sorting. 
We now present a simple model of teacher sorting and discuss the relationship between teacher 
mobility, teacher characteristics and school characteristics. Our approach to the sorting 
discussion builds on Bonesrønning et al. (2003) and is also inspired by Boyd et al. (2003). In a 
conventional flexible wage world, teacher wages would adjust to compensate for non-pecuniary 
characteristics of schools and regions, living costs and alternative job opportunities. This is 
formally illustrated in equation (1), where Wis is the equilibrium wage individual i receives in 
school s, Xs is a vector of non-pecuniary school and regional characteristics corresponding to 
school s, and Zi is a vector of individual characteristics. 
 
(1)  ( , )is s iW f X Z=  
 
In such a setting, the required wage the teachers demand to compensate for the non-pecuniary 
characteristics of the schools could be identified by estimating a hedonic wage equation with 
measured non-wage school and regional characteristics and individual characteristics entered on 
the right hand side and conditioning on the number of teacher positions, appropriately 
instrumented to account for wage elastic teacher demand. This approach is not meaningful in the 
present case, which is characterized by a rigid teacher wage. Instead of wages adjusting to clear 
the market, teachers sort themselves systematically across schools due to regional differences in 
living costs and outside opportunities, and on the basis of preferences for non-wage school 
characteristics. This leads to another set of hedonic equations with teacher characteristics in a 
given school as functions of non-pecuniary school and regional characteristics. 
 
To illustrate this situation, suppose that the most productive teachers in terms of contribution to 
student learning systematically tend to prefer schools with certain characteristics, and that the 
school principals want to hire the most productive teachers.  Teacher sorting is then likely to 
imply significant differences in teacher quality across schools and regions. In particular, if 
teachers tend to prefer schools with native students and students with favorable socioeconomic 
background, children from ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups are left with the 
least productive teachers. This will add to the initial costs of providing education for these 
children. Recent US evidence documents that teacher quality is an important determinant of 
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educational outcomes (Rivkin et al., 2001), and that teacher characteristics vary widely between 
schools and regions (Lankford et al., 2002 and Boyd et al., 2003). 
  
Ideally, an analysis of teacher sorting and teacher quality differences across schools should be 
based on a complete characterization of the individual decisions of occupational choice, the 
initial matching process of schools and teachers of different quality, and the transition of teachers 
between schools and out of teaching. Since this is a very demanding task, this paper focuses on a 
limited part of the sorting process: the teacher’s decision whether to stay in his current teacher 
position or not. We do not consider the determinants of the initial matching of teachers and 
schools, nor do we consider the decision to choose education to qualify for teacher jobs in the 
first place. 
 
We base our analysis on the conventional view that teachers make rational decisions on whether 
to leave a teacher job or not and follow the framework in Hanushek et al. (2002). Consider a 
teacher currently holding a teacher position and continuously evaluating the current workplace 
compared to alternative choices. Each year he makes a decision whether to stay on or leave his 
current teacher position. The decision problem of leaving is formally described in equation (2), 
where asX  denotes characteristics of alternative jobs and c represents the costs of moving from 
the current job to the alternative measured in utility terms. 
 
(2)   ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ), ,< −ai s i i s i ipV u X Z pV u X Z c Z  
 
The teacher will quit if the present value utility, pV(ui(.)), at the present job is smaller than at the 
alternative, taking moving costs into account. Notice that the alternative includes both teaching 
in another school, the possibility to exit for a job in the private sector, and leaving the workforce. 
The mobility costs are likely to differ between different destinations, and to depend on individual 
characteristics. 
 
To empirically analyze the sorting of teachers, we consider a reduced form quit model, and use 
equation (2) to discuss the sorting of teachers and to motivate the role of individual teacher 
characteristics, school characteristics and outside opportunities in determining quit propensity. 
An important issue is how to establish the link between teacher quality and the quit model in 
equation (2). If teachers whose characteristics are known to be important for student 
achievement have a higher propensity to leave schools with high share of disadvantaged students 
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than other teachers, this would imply that these schools are left with teachers of lower quality 
than other schools. The empirical literature, however, has not been able to provide much robust 
evidence on the association between student achievement and measured teacher characteristics. 
Ferguson (1991) and Ehrenberg & Brewer (1994) present evidence that students exposed to 
teachers educated at selective colleges in the US has higher achievement than other students, and 
teachers test scores have been shown to increase student achievement by Hanushek (1971) and 
Ehrenberg & Brewer (1995). Unfortunately, we have not access to this type of information for 
the teachers in our sample. Recent evidence based on Texas data (Hanushek et al., 2002) 
suggests that teachers with only a few years of teaching experience are less productive in terms 
of student achievement. A school where a lot of teachers quit from one year to another will likely 
need to hire young and inexperienced teachers in vacant positions and the evidence then suggests 
that these schools will on average have lower teacher quality. In our data, the correlation 
between the quit rate (see definition in section 4) at a school and the share of teachers below 30 
years of age the next year at the same school is equal to 0.15.9 
 
3.3 Explanatory variables 
School characteristics 
We now consider that part of the vector Xs which corresponds to single school characteristics. 
Norwegian schools are highly regulated and similar with respect to curriculum taught, teaching 
methods and the number of hours the teacher has to spend in the classroom. Yet, the schools may 
differ in other respects, such as physical environments and working conditions. Our hypothesis is 
that the composition of students and teachers at the school are important determinants of the 
working conditions, and we assume initially that the composition is exogenous with respect to 
the individual teacher decisions. First, some student groups are likely to require more effort to 
teach than other groups. In particular, we will consider the share of the students belonging to 
ethnic and language minorities and the share of the students with special needs. Ideally, one 
would like to include a range of variables characterizing the student body composition at the 
schools in analysis of quit behavior. But due to data limitations, we focus on these two variables 
that hopefully will capture the most relevant aspects of the student body composition.  
 
                                                 
9 Even if quit occurs randomly among teachers with different productivity, student learning may be less in high 
turnover schools if student learning is related to teacher cooperation and team-work, since coordination would be 
less easy in a school where a lot of the teachers quit from year to year. However, there exists no systematic evidence 
on the level of turnover required to induce such effects. 
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Ethnic composition measured by the share of black and Hispanic students has been found to be 
positively related to teacher quits in US schools (Gritz & Theobald, 1996, Hanushek et al., 2002, 
and Loeb et al., 2002). At the same time, schools with high percentage of minority students in 
US are often found in inner-city areas and generally poor and unsafe neighborhoods with fiscal 
problems due to local property tax financing of school expenditure. There is a tendency also in 
Norway that immigrant people is overrepresented in urban areas.10 However, it is fair to say that 
the level of ethnic segregation is much lower than in the US. According to Figure 4 below, 
relatively few schools have more than 50 percent minority students and most of the schools 
enrolling minority students have a minority share of less than 10 percent. Another important 
difference between the US and Norwegian context is that education resources are generally much 
more evenly distributed in Norway. The fiscal system is heavily centralized with centrally 
determined tax rates and considerable income redistribution between local areas through the 
central government grant system which finance a large share of local school budgets. An 
important question then is why schools in Norway with minority students can still be expected to 
have a higher quit rate than other schools. In our data, minority students are defined as students 
whose parents speak a foreign language, for which a large majority arrived Norway during the 
last 30 years.11 Such students have the right to additional language instruction until they have a 
god command in the Norwegian language. Recourses targeted to these students usually take the 
form of instruction support in ordinary classes, see Bonesrønning et al. (2003) for a closer 
discussion. For these reasons, instruction of such students is likely to require more effort from 
the teachers than instruction of other students both due to language problems and a more 
demanding communication with their parents. Thus, our hypothesis is that teachers, all else 
equal, want to leave schools with a high share of minority students to obtain more pleasant 
working conditions.  
 
Students with special needs are defined as students for which there are allocated extra resources. 
A fundamental goal in the integration policy has been that physically, mentally and emotionally 
disabled students should go to the same schools and be in the same classrooms as ordinary 
students. According to the school act, such students shall be allocated extra resources based on 
individual education plans to be designed in an interaction between teachers, parents and 
                                                 
10 In 2001, more than 50 percent of the immigrants from non-western countries resided in the Oslo area. Also in 
other parts of the country people with minority background tend to be located in the cities. 
11 The most common mother tongue of the minority students in the school year 2002–03 are Urdu (15 percent), 
Arabian (9 percent) and Somalian (9 percent). 
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specialists on disabled students. The extent and type of extra resources depends on the type of 
disability the student possesses, but usually classes with one or more special needs students 
receive additional instructional support by an extra teacher and/or teacher assistant. There is no 
special formal certification requirement for teachers teaching special needs students, but often 
they have some extra courses. While schools with many students with special needs are given 
more resources, it is still possible that instruction of classes with many special needs students 
requires extra teacher effort due to communication problems and more disruptive behavior.  
 
Due to the absence of information on other socio-economic characteristics of the students at the 
school level it is difficult to judge whether special needs students are systematically over-
represented in schools in low-income neighborhoods and areas with social problems as is often 
found in US studies. Using variation across Norwegian local governments, Borge & Pettersen 
(1998) find some tendency that local government spending on special needs students is 
negatively related to private income and positively related to the share of children below 18 
years with lone mothers. However, their regression models have low explanatory power and 
most of the variation in the share of special needs students across local governments therefore 
remains unexplained.  
 
While the student body composition is likely to be an important determinant of the working 
conditions in a school, the quality and characteristics of the other teachers within the school may 
also influence an individual teacher’s decision to quit. The argument that employees prefer to 
work near similar individuals, with worker segregation as a result, can be dated back to the 
seminal work on discrimination by Becker (1971). The large majority of the certified teachers in 
primary and upper secondary schools in Norway are educated at specific teacher colleges. While 
certified teachers have similar educational background, schools with recruitment problems are 
forced to use non-certified teachers with very diverse background, which may be less attractive 
colleges than other certified teachers. This argument suggests that the propensity to quit for 
tenured certified teachers with permanent appointment is higher in schools that hire non-certified 
teachers than in schools not hiring non-certified teachers. In the empirical model we include a 
dummy variable that equals unity if the school employs at least one non-certified teacher at the 
time when the teacher makes his decision to quit or not. This variable may also capture the effect 
of other school characteristics. The legal rule in Norway is that applicants for teacher jobs 
without formal certification can only be appointed in a teacher position when no certified 
teachers is willing to take the job. Non-certified teachers can only be offered short-term contracts 
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and accordingly, they are typically young with little experience.12 A school that needs to hire 
non-certified teachers is thus likely to face significant recruitment problems. The fact that we 
model the quit propensity for certified, permanently appointed teachers and measure the hiring of 
non-certified teachers in the year before we observe the quitting behavior, implies that there 
should be no mechanical correlation between the quit propensity and the dummy variable for 
non-certified teachers. 
 
As noted above, several authors have included measures of class size and resource use per 
student as explanatory variables in teacher turnover studies. The measure of resource use per 
student used in our model is the number of teaching hours per student. As in hedonic wage 
regressions as equation (1), the number of teachers is likely to be determined by an interaction 
between demand and supply. We show below that exclusion of this variable from the model does 
not alter the effects of the other variables. Another resource use variables included is a dummy 
variable for whether there is a library at the school.  
 
School size, which we measure by the number of students, may also be important for quit 
decisions.  On the one hand, quits may be seen as a result of mismatch between teacher and 
school, and as the school size increases, the possibility of moving teachers among classes and 
subjects within a school will increase and the probability of obtaining a satisfactory match 
should increase. On the other hand, large schools may be viewed as less unattractive due to 
crowding and more bureaucracy. Thus, we will include both the number of students squared and 
dummy variables for the smallest schools in the model to capture the possibility of non-
linearities in the school size effects. In addition dummy variables for school type is included.13 
 
Regional characteristics 
Although teacher wages does not vary between schools, the real teacher wage will obviously 
vary due to variation in living costs across regions. The real wage associated with teaching in 
schools within a school district is equal, while real wages associated with schools in different 
regions varies with the local living costs. Next, expected utility related to the non-teacher 
                                                 
12 In the school year 1999/2000, 31.6% (11%) of the non-certified (certified) teachers were below 30 years of age. 
13 The schools are divided into four groups; schools with students at both the primary and lower secondary level 
with separate classes in each grad (Combined school), schools with students only at the primary educational level 
with separate classes at each grade (Primary school), schools with students only at the lower secondary level with 
separate classes at each grade (Secondary school), and schools with students at different grades in the same class 
(Mixed school).  
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alternative is equal to the highest expected real wage level the teacher can attain in the private 
sector. Thus, ideally, we should include a variable describing the amount of money a person with 
teacher education and given individual characteristics would earn in a non-teaching job as done 
in Dolton & van der Klaauw (1995). The only available data for alternative wages is private 
income per capita in the local government. We also include the local unemployment rate to 
capture variation in the probability of getting outside employment. Since the income variable 
includes both labor and non-labor earnings it is obviously a very crude proxy for outside pay 
opportunities for teachers. Given these limitations and since our primary interest is to investigate 
the effect of school student body composition on teacher quit, one solution is to include a set of 
regional or school district dummy variables to capture permanent variation in characteristics 
across regions or districts.  
 
Individual characteristics 
We now consider individual characteristics, Z, which may influence the teacher’s decision to 
quit for given school and regional characteristics. According to (2), mobility costs, and thereby 
the quit propensity, depends on individual characteristics. First, the teacher’s family situation 
may affect the propensity to quit. One reason is that teachers with children are likely to have 
lower mobility costs than teachers without family obligations. Unfortunately, like the majority of 
the studies in this branch, we do not have information on the family situation of the teachers. 
Instead, the teacher’s age would capture some of these effects, and since family obligations are 
not linearly related to age, the square of the age is also included. In addition, the role of family 
obligations is often different for men and women. A common conjecture is that women are more 
likely to leave teaching in order to take care of children than men, and Stinebrickner (1998) 
provide evidence in support of this hypothesis based on a national US sample. However, in the 
Scandinavian countries, with generous rules for leave due to birth (approximately one year paid 
leave financed by the national government) and heavily subsidized governmental child care, 
these mechanisms is expected to be much less prevalent than in the US. Teachers on paid leave 
are not treated as quitters in our empirical analysis, but the propensity for leaving the school the 
next school year may be different for these teachers. Thus, we include a dummy variable 
indicating whether the teacher is on full or partly paid leave.  
 
Third, quit propensity may depend on the teacher’s education level. An obvious reason is that the 
set of outside alternatives increases with education level. As an example, a teacher with two 
years education in addition to the basic three-year education at a teacher college will likely be 
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more attractive both for other schools and private sector employers compared to a teacher with 
only basic teacher college education. The data set also include school leaders. Since their pay 
and working tasks differ from ordinary teachers, a dummy variable is included in the model. As 
a final individual characteristic, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the teacher has 
a fulltime or part-time position.  
 
 
4. Descriptive evidence. 
The present paper uses data on teachers in primary and lower secondary Norwegian schools 
during the school years 1992-93 to 1999-2000. The data covers the whole country, which means 
that we avoid the problem of distinguishing between teachers migrating between states and 
districts and those leaving teaching that has plagued US studies using administrative data. In this 
section and in section 5.3, we will distinguish between three destinations; mobility to another 
school in the same local government, mobility to another school in another local government, 
and leaving the education sector. In addition, since the extent of private schools in Norway is 
negligible, the exit to such schools is not a realistic option for the teachers.14 
 
In order to restrict the study to true voluntary quits, we include only teachers with permanent 
appointment in the analysis. Thus, temporary teachers and teachers on short-term contracts are 
excluded.  In addition, teachers above 60 years of age are excluded in order to avoid including 
retirement decisions. The data reduction is more closely described in Appendix A.  
 
As to the extent of teacher turnover in Norway, on average, 9.5 percent of the teachers used in 
the present analysis leave their current school from one year to another. In order to get some 
further feeling with the main features of the mobility, Figures 1-5 describe how teacher 
transitions are related to certain school and individual characteristics. The figures present the 
overall quit rate, and decompose this rate into inter-district mobility (Move_m), intra-district 
mobility (Move_s), and mobility out of the school sector (Move_o). 
 
Figure 1 shows the development over time in the average turnover rate. While being relatively 
constant at 8% in the first three years, the rate started to increase in 1996 and was close to 12 % 
in 1997 and 1998. The turnover rate increased both for male and female teachers and for all age 
groups. The sharp increase in the average turnover rate from 1995 occurs when the average 
                                                 
14 In the school year 1995/96, 1.5 percent of the students were enrolled in private schools. 
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unemployment rate in Norway declined sharply. One hypothesis is that as the unemployment 
rate declined, more teachers took advantage of the improved possibilities for work and higher 
pay in other occupations. In accordance with this hypothesis, Figure 1 shows that the increased 
turnover after 1995 is due to higher propensity to leave the school sector. These changes in 
turnover rates over time points to the importance of including variables capturing the labor 
market situation in the econometric model.  
 
Figure 2 plots the teacher turnover rate against school size measured by the number of students. 
The turnover rate seems to be highest for the smallest and largest schools, which indicates that 
non-linear terms should be included in the econometric model in order to capture the full effect 
of school size on turnover. Notice that there are some very small schools in Norway due to 
scattered population in some areas. We will test whether exclusion of these schools from the 
sample alter the empirical results. 
 
Figure 3 shows that the turnover rate is declining in age. The average turnover rate for teachers 
at age 24 is 25 percent, while the average turnover rate for those at age 60 is about 7 percent.15  
 
Figure 4 shows a positive relationship between the teacher turnover rate and the share of students 
at the school belonging to ethnic and language minorities. This relationship is driven by mobility 
out of education and to a new school in the same district. While the average turnover rate among 
teachers at schools without minority students is around 9 percent, the average turnover rate at 
schools with at least 55 percent minority students is about 16 percent. As regards to the 
relationship between teacher turnover and the share of students with special needs, Figure 5 
shows that the teacher turnover rate is somewhat higher in schools with a relatively large share 
of students with special needs, although the relationship is less clear than for minority students. 
Taken together, Figures 4 and 5 suggest that teacher turnover is related to student composition, 
although strong conclusions on the causal effect of student composition on teacher mobility 
behavior cannot be drawn on the basis of these figures. The third variable measuring the working 
conditions at the school, the dummy variable for whether the school employs non-certified 
teachers in the previous year, also seems to be important for quits. The average quit rate for 
                                                 
15 The skewed distribution of observations with respect to age is in large part due to previous changes in teacher 
demand related to the rapid growth in the number of students during the 1960s and 1970s and a subsequent fall in 
the 1980s. 
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permanently appointed certified teachers is 10.4 percent at schools employing non-certified 
teachers and 8.7 percent at the other schools. 
 
Table A1 includes descriptive statistics of all variables used in the empirical model. 65 percent 
of the teachers are female, 28 percent are working part time, and 2 percent are on paid leave. The 
average (weighted) school size is 240 students, and almost half of the schools are pure primary 
schools with separate classes on each grade. Almost half of the teachers work at schools 
employing both certified and non-certified teachers. 
 
5. Econometric evidence. 
In this section we present the results from estimating reduced form quit equations corresponding 
to the decision rule (2). To facilitate comparison with other studies in the area, our baseline 
model is a binary model where the teacher’s only choice considered is whether or not to leave his 
current school appointment.  In section 5.3 we estimate a less restrictive version where we allow 
the effect of the explanatory variables to differ between quits for three different destinations.  
 
5.1. Baseline model 
We estimate a probit version of the model where the left hand side variable is equal to unity if 
the teacher leaves a particular school from year t to year t+1 and zero otherwise. The baseline 
results are presented in Table 1. Column (1) shows the preferred model, which includes region 
specific effects (90 regions) and time specific effects (7 years).16 For the probit model, we only 
present the estimated mean probability derivatives throughout the paper. Columns (2) and (3) 
show that the results do not change much when interaction between the time specific and region 
specific effects (630 variables) are included, or when the region specific effects are replaced by 
school district specific effects (432 local government specific effects). 
 
The full model results of the preferred model, including the effects of the individual 
characteristics, are reported in Appendix Table A1. The effects of the individual characteristics 
are mainly as expected. Young teachers have a higher propensity to quit than old teachers, 
confirming results elsewhere in the literature. The numerical results show that the marginal 
effect of increased age on the probability of quitting at mean values of quit is about -0.60 and -
0.15 percentage points when the initial age is 25 and 60, respectively. The propensity to quit 
increases by educational level. Increasing the educational level from three years of higher 
                                                 
16 The regions used are the labor market regions constructed by Statistics Norway on the basis on commuting data. 
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education (28.8 percent of the observations) to the highest possible educational level (which is 
six years of higher education and account for 2.6 percent of the observations), the quit 
probability at mean increases by 3.6 percentage points.17 Although the US evidence on the effect 
of teacher qualifications is somewhat mixed, the results generally supports the hypothesis that 
the quit rate is increasing in qualification level. A reasonable interpretation is that teachers with 
higher education have better outside opportunities and therefore have a higher propensity to quit. 
This is also consistent with the evidence in Dolton & van der Klaauw (1995).18  
 
We find that the quit probability is 0.6 percentage points lower for women than for men, 
evaluated at the sample mean. Several studies from the US have found the opposite result. Using 
a longitudinal national US sample, Stinebrickner (1998) found that female teachers are more 
reluctant than males to leave teaching for family reasons. The difference across the countries 
must be related to more generous Scandinavian rules for leave due to birth, highly subsidized 
publicly provided child care, high flexibility in working time, and the fact that teachers on paid 
leave are not defined as quitters in the present analysis. Actually, the higher quitting propensity 
for male teachers seems perfectly consistent with the reasonable hypothesis that males’ 
opportunity cost in terms of expected wage in other occupations is higher than for women. 
Although a common belief is that there is much greater gender equality in the labor market in 
Scandinavian countries than in the US, the overall gender pay gap in Norway is still sizeable. 
According to Blau and Kahn (2003), the gap in log earnings between men and women in the 
1985-94-period was 0.275 and 0.395 log points in Norway and USA, respectively, while the 
average gap across the 22 countries in their study was 0.309. 
 
                                                 
17 Estimations based on a dummy variable approach, using dummy variables for each educational level, showed that 
the effect was extremely close to linear. According to the raw data, the share of the teachers who quit is 8.1, 9.7, 
10.3 and 11.9 percent for teachers with three, four, five and six years of higher education, respectively. 
18 Taken literally, the finding suggests that the wage premium for teachers with higher education is too low, which 
might be reasonable given the highly compressed wage distribution for teachers. However, such a conclusion is 
based on the assumption that the mobility in general is independent of educational level and that highly educated 
teachers perform better than less educated teachers, measured by their contribution to student achievement. While 
we have not been able to analyze the effect of teacher education on student achievement in Norway, existing US 
evidence gives very weak support for the hypothesis that more highly educated teachers generate higher student 
achievement (Rivkin et al., 2001).  
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Regarding the other variables measured at the individual level, the results are as expected. 
School leaders, teachers working part time, and teachers on leave are more reluctant to quit than 
others. 
 
Regarding the variables of main interest, the following results are robust across the specifications 
in Table 1:  
i) Teachers working at schools with high share of minority students and students with 
special needs have higher propensity to quit.  
ii) Teachers working at schools using individuals without teacher certification in 
teaching positions in the previous school year have a higher quit probability. 
 
The composition of the students seems to have an impact on the quit decision. Comparing a 
school with no minority students with a school with 10 percent minority students, the propensity 
to quit is about 0.4 percentage points larger in the latter case. For the share of students with 
special needs, the corresponding figure is 0.6 percentage points higher propensity to quit. These 
effects are quite large if one compares schools where nearly all students belong to a minority or 
have special needs with schools without such students.  
 
The model formulation so far implies a linear association between the probability to quit and our 
variables describing student body composition. However, it is possible that this formulation 
implies a misspecification of the true effects. To investigate whether the linear specification is 
reasonable, the effect of student composition on the quit probability was estimated using a 
dummy variable approach. The model allows the effect of schools with a minority share of, say, 
[10,15 , to differ freely from schools with a minority share outside this range, but restrict the 
effect of student composition to be equal within each group. For the minority share, schools with 
a minority share of at least 50 percent are grouped together because they are too few to split into 
several groups, and the same is the case for schools where at least 20 percent of the students have 
special needs. The result from this model is shown in Figure 6. Both the effects of the minority 
share and the share of students with special needs are reasonable linear. According to the results, 
the quit probability on schools where the minority share is in the range [15, 20  is 0.4 percentage 
points higher than in schools without minority students. The corresponding result for students 
with special needs is 0.7 percentage points. Thus, it seems fair to conclude that the effects of 
student composition are not driven by outliers.  
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According to result ii), the propensity to quit also seems to depend on teacher composition at the 
school. The mean propensity to quit is about 0.7 percentage points higher at schools that have to 
utilize individuals without teacher certification in teaching positions than in schools that only 
employ certified teachers.19  
 
Even though the results clearly suggest that the student and teacher compositions are important 
determinants of teacher quit behavior, these effects cannot be interpreted as pure discrimination 
effects. Both student composition variables may to some extent pick up unmeasured background 
factors such as low parental income, high share of lone parents and so on, which may be the true 
variables that affect teacher behavior. In addition, we cannot rule out the possibility that teacher 
composition may proxy for other factors that makes the school unattractive from a teacher’s 
point of view.  
 
The relation between the probability to quit and school size turns out to be highly nonlinear. The 
model includes the number of students, the number of students squared, and dummy variables 
for schools with less than 20 pupils and for schools with 20,60⎡⎣ pupils. The model implies that 
there is an “optimal” school size in terms of quit of about 370 pupils. The quit probability is 
equal for schools with about 70 and 670 pupils, which is about 1.4 percentage points above the 
quit probability for schools with 370 pupils. For the smallest schools, the quit probability is even 
higher than implied by the quadratic specification because the dummy variables for the small 
schools have positive effects.20 
 
Above, we argued that small class size and high resource use at the school may lead to lower 
teacher quit rate. However, contrary to prior expectations, the variable measuring resource use, 
teacher education hours per student, has a positive and significant effect at 5 percent level. 
Increasing the resource use by 2 standard deviations increases, according to the model, the quit 
probability by 0.4 percentage points. It is possible that the positive effect is due to an omitted 
                                                 
19 Notice that excluding this variable from the model does not alter the effects of the other variables in the model. 
We have also calculated a variable measuring to what extent a school has to rely on non-certified teachers. Using 
this variable instead of the dummy variable for utilization of non-certified teachers gave the same fit to the data and 
none of the effects of the other variable in the model changed. This result indicated that an increase from zero to 20 
percent of non-certified teachers at a school increases the propensity to quit for certified teachers by 1.3 percentage 
points.  
20 The model implies that the mean quit probability for teachers at schools with 10 and 50 pupils are 3.5 and 2.6 
percentage points larger than for a school with 370 pupils. 
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variable bias. There may be some compensating elements in teacher education hours with regard 
to factors not captured by the model. For example, while the model includes the share of the 
students with special needs as a separate variable, the variation in ability within this student 
group is likely to be large. Because we have defined students with special needs as students for 
which there are allocated extra resources, students with large needs will increase the resource use 
at school more than students with minor extra needs. Thus, high resource use may in part capture 
unmeasured student composition effects.21 The model includes one other variable that should 
partly capture resource use not related to student composition, namely a dummy variable 
indicating whether the school has a library. This variable has the expected negative effect. 
 
In addition to the individual and school factors discussed above, school district factors also 
influence the decision on whether to quit or not. The quit rate is higher in large local 
governments than in small local governments measured by the log of the population, probably 
due to more school choice alternatives in such communities as discussed below. In addition, the 
quit decision seems to be influenced by the unemployment rate. The results suggest that a 
doubling of the local unemployment rate reduces the probability that a teacher quits by about 0.8 
percentage points. The effect of the income level of the inhabitants in the local government is 
positive as expected, but not statistically significant. The absence of any significant effect of this 
variable is not surprising, since it is only a crude proxy for the alternative wage outside teaching. 
A fair conclusion is that outside wages are better proxied by the teacher’s level of education. 
 
5.2. Sensitivity analyses 
While the results so far seems to be quite robust across specifications, it is important to 
undertake further sensitivity analyses to check whether the model is robust in different 
dimensions. Firstly, we have been assuming that non-pecuniary school factors are exogenous to 
the individual teacher’s quit decision. One problem with this assumption is that teachers who 
desire stability may seek out, for example, schools with few minority students in which to work 
if there is less inherent turnover at these schools. Alternatively, teachers with a preference for 
more variation across years in where they work may enjoy working in schools with a higher 
percentage of minority students. One way to address the importance of such effects is to include 
                                                 
21 As noted above, the number of teachers and thereby the number of teaching hours at school is likely to be 
determined in an interaction between teacher supply and demand. Thus, this variable my be endogenously 
determined together with teacher quit behavior. Notice that if this variable is excluded from the model, the effect of 
the student composition variables increases slightly, the effect of the shares of minority students and special needs 
students in the preferred specification increases from 0.038 to 0.041 and from 0.057 to 0.062, respectively. 
  
20
individual fixed effects in the model. The results of a fixed effects logit model are presented in 
column (4) in Table 1. All major effects remain significant at conventional levels.  
 
One feature of the individual fixed effect approach is that only teachers quitting at least once 
contribute to the log likelihood. Thus, stable non-quitting teachers, which account for the 
majority of the teachers, are excluded from the sample. In the reduced sample, the mean 
probability of quitting is about 25 percent compared to about 10 percent in the total sample. The 
marginal effects presented in brackets in column (4) in the table is evaluated at mean of the 
sample used in the estimation, while evaluating the effects at mean for the whole sample yields 
affects that are about half of the size reported. Nevertheless, the estimated negative effect of the 
minority share on quit propensity is clearly larger in the individual fixed effect specification than 
in the baseline specification. Also the effect of the share of students with special needs remains 
strong, and the difference between small and medium sized schools increases. The effect of non-
certified teachers employed at school seems to become smaller, but are still significant at five 
percent level.  
 
Secondly, we have so far assumed that the individual teacher characteristics only affect the 
probability to exit from the current school. In this section we investigate whether the effect of 
school characteristics differ across different type of teachers and schools. First, quit behavior 
may differ between women and men because of different mobility cost for family reasons, and 
the fact that our model does not include variables describing the family situation may in 
particular bias the results for women. But as the first two columns of Table 2 show, the behavior 
of men and women are surprisingly similar. However, there is a tendency that the quit decision 
for female teachers is more responsive to both the student and teacher compositions than is the 
case for men. More surprisingly, the effect of local unemployment is also larger for women than 
for men. 
 
So far we have assumed that differences in mobility costs may affect the quit propensity directly. 
However, differences in mobility costs may also affect the relationship between individual quit 
behavior and non-pecuniary job attributes. In particular, quit propensity may differ between 
young and mature teachers as first suggested by Bartel (1982) who found that young men were 
more likely to quit repetitive jobs than mature men. Hanushek et al. (2002) using Texas data, 
find that the positive quit effect of high minority share of students is highest among the least 
experienced teachers. In order to investigate whether the relationship between quit propensity 
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and non–pecuniary variables depends on the teacher’s age, we estimated the model on six sub-
samples; teachers below 30 years of age, between 30-50 years of age, and above 50 years of age, 
separately for men and women.  Due to the skewed age-distribution in the total sample of 
teachers as seen in Figure 3, the sub-sample of the youngest teachers is relatively small. The 
results from this exercise are presented in columns (3)–(8) in Table 2. The effect of both the 
student and teacher composition variables has the same sign as in the baseline model for all 
groups but the effects are less precisely estimated especially for men in different age groups.  But 
taken together, while some differences exist, the results do not seem to vary dramatically 
between teachers of different age and gender.  
 
As a further check on the robustness of our results, we split the sample with respect to working 
time and estimate separate models for those working full-time and those working part-time. 
According to the results presented in columns (9)-(10) in Table 2, teachers working part time 
respond somewhat stronger to the student and teacher compositions at the school than teachers 
working full time, but all effects of these three variables are significantly positive at 5 percent 
level for both groups. On the other hand, only teachers working full time seem to respond to the 
local labor market conditions measured by the local unemployment rate. 
 
So far, the effect of school size in the different sub-samples is remarkably similar. One objection 
may be that this result, and possibly also the effects of other variables in the model, is driven by 
special circumstances at small schools. Restricting the sample to schools above 200 students, for 
which the results are presented in column (11) in Table 2, we find that schools with 390 pupils 
have the lowest quit probability. Thus, we conclude that the result for the “optimal” school size 
is not driven by the inclusion of small schools in the sample. In addition there are only minor 
changes in the effect of the other variables.  
 
An additional question is whether it is reasonable to pool several years in the sample in one 
equation. With our approach, teachers who come into the sample in the later years have a smaller 
window in which to make mobility decisions than more experienced teachers. We have 
investigated whether this may bias the results in two ways. First, we reduced the sample only to 
those teaching in the first year of the sample, the school year 1992–93. Second, we included a 
full set of cohort–year interaction variables (27 variables), where cohort is defined as the first 
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year a teacher is in the sample. The results of both these specifications are qualitatively equal to 
the baseline results.22   
 
5.3. Multinomial model. 
The model used so far restricts the effects of the explanatory variables on the probability to exit a 
school to be independent of destination. As noted above, most studies of the relationship 
between non-pecuniary school factors and teacher quits restrict the analysis to cover between 
district moves within certain US states. However, recent evidence provided by Betts et al. (2000) 
from California and Loeb (2000) from New York State, suggests that teacher characteristics 
differ considerably within school districts. To investigate whether the effect of non-pecuniary 
school characteristics on teacher quit probability depends on destination, we estimate a 
multinomial logit model with three possible destinations: new school in same school district, 
new school in another school district, and out of teaching. Staying at the current school is chosen 
as the reference state.23 The results are presented in Table 3. 
 
The quit model in equation (2) above gives some information on the likely effects of the 
included variables on these different kinds of moves. First, it is likely that the decision to leave 
the education sector is more responsive to labor market variables as outside pay and local 
unemployment rate than the decision to change school within a local government. Second, the 
decision to change school within local government is likely to be most responsive to school 
characteristics.  Since taking a teacher job in another local government often means a change in 
residence, the moving costs involved in obtaining a satisfactory match between the teacher’s 
preferences and school characteristics is smaller for moves within than between local 
governments. 
 
Our working hypothesis is that teachers search for the “best” school mainly within the school 
district, which implies that school characteristics should be most important for within-school-
districts mobility. The results from the multinomial model give some evidence that this is indeed 
the case. The estimated coefficients for the student composition variables are larger for the 
                                                 
22 In the first case, the sample is reduced by 20 percent, and the marginal effects of the minority share, the special 
needs share, and of non-certified teachers employed are equal to 0.036, 0.042 and 0.005, respectively. In the second 
case, the marginal effects are equal to 0.034, 0.055 and 0.007, respectively. 
23 A multinomial model can be theoretically justified by using a random utility model combined with the assumption 
that choices are independent of irrelevant alternatives. This means that the relative choice probabilities between two 
alternatives are independent on the other alternatives (Green, 1997). 
  
23
probability to move to another school within the same school district than for the other 
destinations. However, student composition also significantly affects moves out of the school 
sector. The results imply that, evaluated at mean values and using the formula in Greene (1997, 
p. 916), increased minority share from zero to 0.2 increases the probability to move to another 
school in the same school district, to a school in another school district and out of the education 
sector by 0.4, 0.1 and 0.3 percentage points, respectively. The importance of school size is also 
strongest for moves within the school district.  
 
On the other hand, the teacher composition is less important for within-district-mobility than for 
other types of quits. One may speculate that this result partly reflects that this variable may 
capture some other unfavorable aspects of the school district not included in the model.  
 
Regarding the included variables at the school district level, the effects of population size is as 
expected. The large positive effect of school district size on within-school-district mobility and 
the negative effect on the mobility to other school districts are consistent with the hypothesis that 
large districts contain more choice opportunities for teachers. The small but significant effect on 
the mobility out of the school sector may be a result of a larger alternative labor market. 
Regional unemployment have the expected negative sign on the mobility out of the school 
sector, but has also an significant impact on within school district mobility.  
 
Consider next the effect of private income on quit probability. This variable is a crude proxy for 
teachers’ alternative wage in the external labor market and may affect the quit probability 
through two main mechanisms. To illustrate, consider a local government with high private 
income. This will partly reflect high wages in the private sector, which in turn also yields high 
housing prices. Because the teacher wage is equal in each local government, the real teacher 
wage is likely to be low in such a community. Thus, if high private income mainly reflects high 
housing prices, we would expect teacher mobility to other local governments to be relatively 
high. On the other hand, if private income mainly captures high wages in the alternative labor 
market for teachers, we would expect the effect on mobility out of the school sector to be high. 
The results in Table 3 show that private income has a negative effect on intra-district mobility 
and a positive effect on the decision to move out of the school sector, which may indicate that 
the second effect dominates. 
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6. Concluding remarks. 
 
Industrial researchers, sociologists and psychologists all stress the idea that non-pecuniary job 
attributes are important determinants of an employee’s decision to quit a job or not. Yet, 
economists are used to view differences in pecuniary rewards measured by wages as main 
arguments in the quit decision since wages themselves should adjust endogenously to match 
differences across jobs in such attributes. However, the assumption that wages are flexible does 
not fit well with the actual functioning of many labor markets. Thus, the relation between non-
pecuniary job attributes and quit behavior should be a concern also for economists. However, the 
empirical identification of the effect of such factors is surely difficult when wages themselves to 
some extent responds to these attributes.  
 
A novel feature of teacher labor markets in Europe is that teacher wages are more or less equal 
within a country and depends almost exclusively on education and experience. In such an 
environment, non-pecuniary job characteristics could be very important determinants of teacher 
mobility. Taken together with recent evidence indicating that teachers are the most important 
input in education production, this point to the importance of understanding teachers quit 
decisions. This paper presents some new econometric evidence from Norway consistent with the 
hypothesis that non-pecuniary job attributes in schools are important determinants of teachers’ 
probability to quit. We find that the propensity to quit is especially high in schools with high 
shares of minority students and students with special needs. Moreover, our model results suggest 
that the teachers leaving these schools tend to move to other schools within the same school 
district. At the same time, the international evidence on student achievement consistently shows 
that minority students have lower achievement than other students, see for example Fertig & 
Schmidt (2002) who, using OECD’s PISA study of student performance in over 30 countries, 
find that regular language at student’s home different from the test language have a large 
negative effect on achievement. The type of teacher sorting revealed in this paper suggest that a 
rigid teacher wage may add to the problems that already exist in providing education for these 
students. 
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Appendix A. The data 
 
The register data consist of all teachers in primary and lower secondary public schools for the 
school years 1992/19993 to 1999/2000. This includes the 1–10th grade, covering students 6 to 16 
years old. The dependent variable is whether the teacher works at the same school in year t+1 as 
in year t. Thus, the last year of the sample is only used to construct the dependent variable. The 
total sample for the school years 1992/1993 to 1998/1999 includes 84,417 teachers and 383,894 
person-year observations. The following observations are excluded from the analysis: Teachers 
without permanent appointment (68,191 observations), the school is closed in year t + 1 (1,422 
observations), the school has paid the teachers a wage premium due to an experiment evaluated 
in Falch (2003) at least once during the empirical period (5,144 observations), teachers above 60 
years of age (15,397 observations), teachers below 23 years of age (125 observations), and 
missing data at the school level (5,467 observations). The final sample consists of 60,444 
teachers and 288,151 observations.  
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics and the baseline model 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Baseline model 
Move 0.095 0.29 0 1 Dependent variable
Move_m 0.023 0.15 0 1 - 
Move_s 0.016 0.12 0 1 - 
Move_o 0.056 0.23 0 1 - 
Age / 100 0.449 0.086 0.23 0.60 -0.947 (16.3) 
(Age / 100) squared 0.209 0.074 0.05 0.36 0.007 (10.6) 
Years of higher education 3.97 0.78 2 6 0.012 (15.6) 
Leader 0.101 0.30 0 1 0.024 (11.6) 
Working part time 0.284 0.45 0 1 0.032 (21.9) 
On leave with full or partly pay 0.021 0.15 0 1 0.094 (22.4) 
Women 0.653 0.48 0 1 -0.006 (4.72) 
Share of minority students at school 0.050 0.09 0 1 0.038 (3.35) 
Share of students with special needs at schools 0.064 0.04 0 1 0.057 (3.32) 
Non-certified teachers employed at school 0.452 0.50 0 1 0.007 (5.03) 
The school has a library 0.311 0.46 0 1 -0.004 (2.32) 
Teacher education hours per student / 100 0.881 0.263 0.41 15.6 0.071 (2.15) 
Pupil / 100 2.37 1.30 0.01 7.83 -0.161 (4.33) 
(Pupil / 100) squared 7.33 7.39 0.0001 61.31 0.022 (3.40) 
Below 20 pupils 0.012 0.11 0 1 0.020 (2.93) 
Between 20 and 60 pupils 0.068 0.25 0 1 0.012 (3.30) 
Combined school 0.160 0.37 0 1 -0.001 (0.51) 
Secondary school 0.250 0.43 0 1 -0.010 (5.09) 
Primary school 0.421 0.49 0 1 - 
Mixed school 0.169 0.37 0 1 -0.001 (0.29) 
ln (Population in the middle of school year) 63,057 123,714 212 502,867 0.008 (5.75) 
ln (Unemployment at the end of school year) 0.038 0.02 0.003 0.183 -0.008 (2.81) 
ln (Mean private income (NOK)) 104,621 23,576 57,258 194,513 0.014 (0.99) 
1992 0.136 0.34 0 1 - 
1993 0.135 0.34 0 1 0.006 (2.19) 
1994 0.136 0.34 0 1 0.003 (0.87) 
1995 0.141 0.35 0 1 -0.002 (0.64) 
1996 0.141 0.35 0 1 0.019 (4.15) 
1997 0.156 0.36 0 1 0.020 (3.30) 
1998 0.159 0.37 0 1 0.016 (2.33) 
Region specific effects     Yes 
Observations (person-years)     288,151 
Log likelihood     -86,224 
Note: The baseline model in the last column is estimated by the probit-model. Mean probability derivates presented. 
Asymptotic t-values in parenthesis, calculated based on standard errors corrected to account for within-school 
clustering of errors. 
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Figure 1: Mobility over time, and the number of observations each year 
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Figure 2: Mobility as a function of school size, and the number of observations in each group. 
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Figure 3: Mobility as a function of age, and the number of observations at each age. 
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Figure 4: Mobility as a function of the share of minority students, and the number of 
observations in each group. 
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Figure 5: Mobility as a function of share of students with special needs, and the number of 
observations in each group. 
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Figure 6: The effect of student composition ± 2 standard errors using a dummy variable approach 
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 Table 1. Estimation results. The dependent variable is equal to unity if the teacher move 
 (1)a (2)a (3)a (4)b 
Share of minority students at school 0.038 
(3.35) 
0.038 
(3.47) 
0.041 
(3.51) 
0.967 (4.50) 
[0.180] 
Share of students with special needs at schools 0.057 
(3.32) 
0.059 
(3.37) 
0.050 
(2.91) 
0.726 (3.03) 
[0.135] 
Non-certified teachers employed at school 0.007 
(5.03) 
0.008 
(5.64) 
0.006 
(4.26) 
0.046 (2.28) 
[0.009] 
The school has a library -0.004 
(2.32) 
-0.004 
(2.28) 
-0.003 
(1.62) 
-0.031 (1.32) 
[-0.006] 
Teacher education hours per student / 100 0.071 
(2.15) 
0.077 
(2.34) 
0.085 
(2.62) 
0.796 (1.68) 
[0.148] 
Pupil / 100 -0.161 
(4.33) 
-0.167 
(4.73) 
-0.149 
(3.91) 
-3.060 (6.12) 
[-0.571] 
(Pupil / 100) squared 0.022 
(3.40) 
0.022 
(3.73) 
0.021 
(3.17) 
0.309 (4.24) 
[0.058] 
Below 20 students 0.020 
(2.93) 
0.019 
(2.76) 
0.023 
(3.40) 
0.607 (5.00) 
[0.113] 
Between 20 and 60 students 0.012 
(3.30) 
0.011 
(3.13) 
0.012 
(3.27) 
0.241 (3.68) 
[0.045] 
Combined school -0.001 
(0.51) 
-0.001 
(0.57) 
0.001 
(0.25) 
0.450 (8.56) 
[0.084] 
Secondary school -0.010 
(5.09) 
-0.010 
(5.06) 
-0.011 
(5.54) 
-0.139 (2.52) 
[-0.026] 
Mixed school -0.001 
(0.29) 
-0.001 
(0.27) 
-0.001 
(0.29) 
0.326 (5.62) 
[0.061] 
ln Population 0.008 
(5.75) 
0.008 
(5.76) 
0.052 
(1.40) 
-0.253 (6.22) 
[-0.047] 
ln Unemployment -0.008 
(2.81) 
-0.008 
(2.35) 
-0.004 
(1.05) 
0.018 (0.33) 
[0.003] 
ln (Mean private income) 0.014 
(0.99) 
0.013 
(0.91) 
0.037 
(1.27) 
0.019 (0.06) 
[0.004] 
Region specific effects Yes No No Yes 
Region – year specific effects No Yes No No 
Municipality specific effects No No Yes No 
Individual fixed effects No No No Yes 
Observations (person-years) 288,151 288,151 288,151 92965 
Log likelihood -86,224 -85,692 -85,785 -28,939 
Mean of predicted probability 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.248 
Note: a Columns (1)–(3) are estimated by the probit-model, mean probability derivates presented. Asymptotic t-
values in parenthesis, calculated based on standard errors corrected to account for within-school clustering of errors. 
b Column (4) is estimated by the fixed effects logit model, asymptotic t-values in parenthesis and probability 
derivatives evaluated at mean of the relevant sample in brackets.  
Individual characteristics and year specific effects are included. The full results of the model in column (1) are 
presented in Appendix Table A1. 
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Table 2. Estimation results for sub-samples. The dependent variable is equal to unity if the teacher move 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Sample Women Men Women 
below 30 
years of age
Men below 
30 years of 
age 
Women 
[30,50] 
years of age
Men 
[30,50] 
years of age
Women 
above 50 
years of age
Men above 
50 years of 
age 
Working 
full time 
Working 
part time 
More than 
200 
students 
Share of minority students at 
school 
0.037 
(3.04) 
0.038 
(2.32) 
0.097 
(1.71) 
0.136 
(1.62) 
0.028 
(2.04) 
0.037 
(1.84) 
0.043 
(2.48) 
0.021 
(1.02) 
0.028 
(2.32) 
0.074 
(3.38) 
0.030 
(2.27) 
Share of students with special 
needs at schools 
0.064 
(3.22) 
0.044 
(1.87) 
0.076 
(0.91) 
0.315 
(2.15) 
0.077 
(3.12) 
0.036 
(1.22) 
0.022 
(0.75) 
0.024 
(0.77) 
0.048 
(2.57) 
0.082 
(2.80) 
0.064 
(1.95) 
Non-certified teachers 
employed at school 
0.009 
(5.32) 
0.004 
(1.71) 
0.010 
(1.23) 
-0.010 
(0.67) 
0.011 
(5.31) 
0.005 
(2.10) 
0.006 
(2.35) 
0.001 
(0.38) 
0.005 
(3.15) 
0.013 
(4.91) 
0.008 
(3.71) 
Teacher education hours per 
student / 100 
0.045 
(1.18) 
0.099 
(1.97) 
0.240 
(1.19) 
0.815 
(2.81) 
0.034 
(0.73) 
0.074 
(1.23) 
0.035 
(0.55) 
0.054 
(0.65) 
0.091 
(2.55) 
0.008 
(0.13) 
0.122 
(1.28) 
Pupil / 100 -0.149 
(3.98) 
-0.178 
(3.41) 
-0.324 
(2.41) 
-0.473 
(1.79) 
-0.147 
(3.44) 
-0.151 
(2.45) 
-0.096 
(2.09) 
-0.210 
(3.80) 
-0.162 
(4.26) 
-0.174 
(3.39) 
-0.186 
(2.22) 
(Pupil / 100) squared 0.022 
(3.51) 
0.020 
(2.23) 
0.045 
(2.25) 
0.047 
(1.17) 
0.021 
(3.00) 
0.016 
(1.67) 
0.016 
(2.31) 
0.027 
(3.11) 
0.021 
(3.33) 
0.025 
(3.07) 
0.024 
(2.15) 
ln Population 0.009 
(5.87) 
0.006 
(3.22) 
0.005 
(0.85) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.012 
(6.29) 
0.007 
(3.42) 
0.005 
(2.15) 
0.003 
(1.27) 
0.008 
(5.33) 
0.009 
(3.86) 
0.011 
(4.47) 
ln Unemployment -0.012 
(3.28) 
-0.003 
(0.72) 
-0.011 
(0.78) 
-0.024 
(0.97) 
-0.015 
(3.64) 
-0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.003 
(0.58) 
-0.004 
(0.73) 
-0.009 
(2.94) 
-0.005 
(1.00) 
-0.007 
(1.35) 
ln (Mean private income) 0.009 
(0.55) 
0.021 
(1.16) 
0.032 
(0.51) 
0.061 
(0.52) 
0.005 
(0.27) 
0.009 
(0.41) 
0.010 
(0.39) 
0.038 
(1.56) 
0.014 
(0.97) 
0.010 
(0.41) 
-0.020 
(0.87) 
Observations (person-years) 188,043 100,108 13,789 4,418 124,694 63,190 49,555 32,466 206,439 81,712 169,715 
Log likelihood -57,760 -28,174 -6,712 -2,161 -39,099 -18,595 -11,759 - 7,227 -57,459 -28,511 -49,831 
Mean of predicted probability 0.0990 0.0872 0.2031 0.2123 0.1004 0.0914 0.0666 0.0620 0.0846 0.1209 0.0924 
Note: Estimated by the probit-model. Mean probability derivates presented. Asymptotic t-values in parentheses, calculated based on standard errors corrected to account for 
within-school clustering of errors. The models have the same specification as the model in column (1) in Table 1 except that the samples differ.
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Table 3. Estimation results taking different destination into account. Multinomial logit model. 
Moving decision Moving to another 
school in the same 
local government 
Moving to another 
school in another 
local government 
Moving out of the 
schooling sector 
Share of minority students at school 0.860 (3.54) 
[0.835] 
0.330 (1.32) 
[0.291] 
0.329 (1.99) 
[0.304] 
Share of students with special needs 
at schools 
0.951 (2.88) 
[0.907] 
 0.040 (0.10) 
[-0.025] 
0.732 (2.69) 
[0.709] 
Non-certified teachers employed at 
school 
 0.050 (1.40) 
[0.042] 
0.099 (2.74) 
[0.091] 
0.111 (4.84) 
[0.108]] 
Teacher education hours per student / 
100 
 -0.054 (0.66) 
[-0.063] 
0.174 (2.90) 
[0.169] 
0.114 (2.65) 
[0.123] 
Pupil / 100 -0.400 (5.93) 
[-0.391] 
-0.079 (1.23) 
[-0.062] 
-0.124 (2.19) 
[-0.113] 
(Pupil / 100) squared 0.039 (3.73) 
[0.038] 
0.008 (0.80) 
[0.058] 
0.022 (2.35) 
[0.021] 
ln Population 0.366 (10.6) 
[0.365] 
 -0.211 (7.12) 
[-0.224] 
 0.076 (3.54) 
[0.071] 
ln Unemployment -0.144 (2.04) 
[-0.137] 
-0.050 (0.72) 
[-0.040] 
-0.108 (2.44) 
[-0.104] 
ln (Mean private income) -0.580 (1.71) 
[-0.607] 
 0.237 (0.77) 
[0.227] 
0.402 (1.90) 
[0.412] 
    
Observations (person-years) 288,151 
Log likelihood -110,118 
Mean of predicted probability 0.0233 0.0157 0.0559 
Note: Estimated by the multinomial logit-model. t-values in parentheses, calculated based on standard errors 
corrected to account for within-school clustering of errors, and marginal effects in brackets, calculated as suggested 
by Greene (1997) and by using mean of predicted probabilities. The model includes the same variables as the model 
in column (1) in Table 1. 
 
 
 
